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Abstract 
 
Much of the literature on the European Union’s development as an international actor has 
focused on either the institutionalisation of foreign policymaking or what type of actor the EU 
can be regarded as. This paper seeks to examine a dimension which has received comparatively 
less attention: how other actors in the international arena view the EU. Recognition is a 
prerequisite for the EU to become a credible international actor. Through examining the EU’s 
debate over lifting its China arms embargo, this paper reflects on the impact of the debate on the 
views of the EU held by two other significant actors – the USA and the PRC – and the 
implications for the EU. The literature on the arms embargo debate has tended to treat it as a 
case study of EU foreign policymaking or as an issue in EU-China relations. Little has been said 
about the broader implications for the image of the EU in the eyes of others. Through analysis of 
the debate’s context and subsequent developments in EU-US and EU-China relations, an 
evaluation is made of whether the debate can be considered as a setback for developing EU 
‘actorness’ and what, if any, lessons have been learned by policymakers. 
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Introduction
1
 
 
The development of the European Union as an international actor is much debated within 
both policymaking circles and academic literature on EU foreign policy. Much of the literature 
has focused on either the institutionalisation of EU foreign policymaking structures or on what 
type of actor (if any) the EU can be considered to represent. This paper seeks to contribute to the 
examination of another dimension of considerable importance, which has arguably received 
comparatively less attention: the extent to which other actors in the international arena view the 
EU as an actual international actor. Such recognition is essentially a prerequisite if the EU is to 
attain the status of credible international actor.  By examining the case of the EU‟s debate over 
lifting its arms embargo on China, this paper reflects on the impact of the debate on the views of 
the EU held by two other key international actors – the United States of America (given its 
significant involvement in the debate) and the People‟s Republic of China – and the implications 
for the EU. 
 
The relevance of examining American and Chinese perspectives extends beyond their 
centrality to the arms embargo debate. The US is the established dominant power of the 
international system, if not outright hegemon, and has been stable in this position since the end 
of the Cold War. Consequently, it has a tendency to identify its interests with the interests of the 
world. It was previously responsible for guaranteeing the security of Western Europe during the 
Cold War and is the traditional ally of these states. Its power has been argued to be in relative 
decline due to the „rise of the rest‟ (which includes the EU and China). The emergence of a more 
independent European foreign policy which may run contrary to certain aspects of American 
policy presents potential challenges for the US.  
 
In the case of China, it is not a traditional ally of the EU although does have historical ties 
with certain Member States. Its own „rise‟ since the end of the Cold War has essentially 
coincided with the EU‟s development as a distinctive presence in the international arena. Thus, 
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its own experiences with the EU are significantly different to that of the US, and its emergence 
as a new power implies that it surveys the international setting – and the actors within it – from a 
different perspective. The PRC also conceptualises world order in a different way to the US and 
even the EU. China has no direct security interests in Europe and vice versa and the two have no 
overlapping spheres of influence. Against this background, there may be substantive differences 
between the US and China in terms of how they view the EU.  
 
The European Union‟s2 arms embargo originated in the response to the violent suppression 
of protestors around Tiananmen Square on the fourth of June, 1989. The EU condemned, via a 
Council Declaration, the killings and called on China to respect the human rights of its citizens 
(European Council, 1989). The Declaration listed the various responses to be adopted by the EU 
which included the “interruption by the Member States… of military cooperation and an 
embargo on trade in arms with China” (European Council, 1989 [emphasis added]). In the US, 
President George H.W. Bush imposed an arms embargo on the same grounds. These policies 
remained in place thereafter, with no evidence of a shift in policy preferences until the proposal 
to lift the EU‟s embargo came in late 2003. The EU internally debated the issue throughout 2004, 
and a transatlantic debate emerged from late 2004, when it looked like the EU was heading 
towards consensus to lift, until the spring of 2005, when the proposal appeared to die.        
 
The existing literature on the arms embargo debate has tended to treat it as a case study of 
EU foreign policymaking and/or as a key issue in EU-China relations (see for example, Casarini 
2006; Stumbaum, 2009). To date little has been said about the broader implications for the image 
of the EU as an international actor in its own right in the eyes of the US and China. The embargo 
debate is an interesting case because security, economic and human rights issues were at stake, 
thus applicable to different facets of the EU‟s international actorness. Through analysis of the 
context of the debate and developments in EU-US and EU-China relations since, this paper will 
evaluate the extent to which the debate can be considered as a setback for the development of the 
EU‟s actorness in international affairs and what, if any, lessons have been learned by 
policymakers in relation to handling potentially contentious issues such as the lifting of the 
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China arms embargo. Interviews conducted by this author in the summer of 2010 in the EU and 
the US will provide insights into these developments.  
 
First, it is useful to briefly review the literature on the EU as an international actor and on 
outsider‟s perceptions of the EU. The third section explores American and Chinese perspectives 
of the EU as an actor in the lead up to the arms embargo debate. This is followed by a summary 
of the proceedings of the arms embargo debate between late 2003 and the spring of 2005 which 
highlights possible reasons for outsiders‟ images of the EU changing. The fifth section examines 
how American and Chinese perspectives of the EU as an international actor changed following 
the debate and the wider implications for the EU‟s „actorness‟. The paper concludes that while 
the debate was undoubtedly a setback for the EU, developments in relations since suggest that 
this was temporary, particularly given the largely positive responses of the US and China to the 
developments of the EU‟s external representation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.                 
 
The EU as an International Actor 
 
This section provides a brief review of the main academic literature on the EU‟s 
„actorness‟. The debate on what „type‟ of actor the EU is reveals little consensus among scholars 
except that for most, its importance to international relations is now beyond doubt and it has a 
distinctive presence. However, these characterisations are predominantly found in academic 
literature, and while undoubtedly useful for conceptualising the EU, they rarely are used in 
studies of outsiders‟ perspectives. Consideration of the literature on external perspectives reveals 
that these various models do not bear relevance to the main ways in which external actors 
understand the EU‟s international presence.   
 
Some scholars have argued that the EU is not an international actor at all, although this 
perspective has to an extent faded in recent years. Neorealists would argue that the Member 
States remain the predominant actors as they will override their commitment to the EU when 
self-interest demands it. Hedley Bull (1982) critiqued the concept of Europe as an international 
actor with „civilian power‟ (discussed below), arguing that the Western European states should 
concentrate on developing their own military capabilities. However, some realist scholars such as 
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Adrian Hyde-Price (2008) have acknowledged that the EU is at least perceived to play an 
important and distinctive role, although remain sceptical of the potential for coherent action. 
Barry Posen (2006) argued that the ESDP project can be seen as a weak form of balancing 
behaviour against the preponderance of US power, giving the EU more leverage in the 
transatlantic relationship.  
 
The expansion of the EU‟s institutional capacity for external action and developing 
presence has led to a proliferation of literature analysing its „actorness‟. The concept of the EU 
as a „civilian‟ power – lacking military force and instead reliant on civilian instruments and 
values – has been a particularly influential model. „Civilian power‟ Europe‟s key proponent, 
François Duchêne, was sceptical of the EU‟s ability to become a military power or to develop a 
regional sphere of influence (1972: 38). However, it had potential as a civilian centre of power, 
facilitating greater EU influence in a world with increasing interdependence (Duchêne, 1972: 
43). The „civilian‟ aspect does not just cover policy instruments, but can also cover the ends of 
policy, which Karen Smith (2008: 22) identifies as “international cooperation, solidarity, 
domestication of international relations… responsibility for the global environment, and the 
diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance”. Thus, having civilian power enables the EU to 
impact on a broad range of issue areas.  
 
Ian Manners‟ „normative power Europe‟ is used to critique discussions of the EU as either 
military or civilian power given their state-centric perspectives which concentrate on assessing 
„state-like‟ qualities. Manners rejected the realist/materialist notion that normative power only 
has efficacy when there is a military capability with which it can be implemented, arguing that it 
is a distinctive form of power in its own right (2002: 242). The very existence of the EU 
“changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded 
expectations of state-centricity” (Manners, 2008a: 45). However, there are limitations to the 
EU‟s ability to promote norms in the international arena: “diffusion of ideas in a normatively 
sustainable way” takes time; the nature of the post-9/11 international climate is much less 
welcoming to the concept of a norms-based international system; the fact that certain actors – 
including the US and China – consider themselves to be “above international norms and law”; 
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and finally normative power requires other actors to recognise the “universality of such norms” 
(Manners, 2008b: 37). 
 
The concept of the EU as a strategic actor has also surfaced. Michael Smith (1998) applied 
this term to the EU‟s involvement in the international political economy. Jolyon Howorth (2010) 
argued that the dynamics of international relations in the post-Cold War era enabled the EU to 
derive influence from its non-hard power sources. Although Howorth advocates the EU as a 
future strategic actor, the article refrains from claiming that the EU is already one. Nevertheless, 
Howorth considers the Lisbon Treaty provisions to represents steps in the right direction.  Juha 
Jokela (2009: 40-1) notes that the European Security Strategy was a clear indication that the EU 
intends to become a strategic actor and how it will be situated in relation to other international 
actors. In the ESS, the EU articulated its global ambitions and stressed the importance of 
„strategic partnerships‟ with emerging powers such as China. However, what these partnerships 
entail and how they will be operationalised remains relatively unclear (Whitman, 2010: 27).  
 
While these contributions address the question of what the EU is, they rarely consider how 
external actors („outsiders‟) view the EU. There is a body of literature now established by a 
relatively small number of academics which takes on this issue, with their most substantive 
contributions surfacing over the past few years. It is useful to briefly examine these 
contributions, as this paper essentially seeks to build on their analyses of external images of the 
EU by examining whether the case of the China arms embargo debate led to the actors involved 
– the US and China – altering their views of the EU in the international arena. So far, such 
analysis has been absent from the literature.  
 
Chaban et al (2006) make the case for why outsiders‟ views of the EU are worth scholarly 
attention. First, they provide insights into how the EU is judged on the international stage and 
how well its policy objectives are translated into practice (Chaban et al, 2006: 247). Second, 
these views have an impact on the EU‟s identity and the roles it plays in international affairs 
through “continuous interaction” (Chaban et al, 2006: 247): how other actors perceive the EU 
and respond to it has an impact on the development of its identity and policy. Finally, images of 
the EU will determine the impact of foreign policy; without being recognised as a legitimate, 
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coherent actor the EU‟s policy will be of little importance to others (Chaban et al, 2006: 248). 
This latter point is particularly salient in the context of the EU attempting to engage with two of 
the most important international actors at the present time. This underpinning logic is often made 
explicit in the other studies referenced here.  
 
Chaban et al (2006) compare two studies carried out between 2004 and 2005 which focus 
on elite views of the EU. One was issue-specific (the EU‟s role in multilateral negotiations); the 
other country-specific (views of the EU in Australia, New Zealand and Thailand). Their results 
indicated that on issue-specific views of the EU there was great coherence between respondents 
(Chaban et al, 2006: 250). Asia-Pacific policy elites‟ views on the EU generally indicated that 
the EU was commonly identified as an economic actor, but respondents from different countries 
were divided on the extent of the EU‟s political power (Chaban et al, 2006: 254-5). This 
indicates the possibility of divergent views of the EU dependent on the actors in question and the 
issue at hand as different actors will be predisposed to view the EU in different ways depending 
on the nature of the relationship.  
 
Some of the most interesting and recent literature on external views of the EU have seen 
various studies and surveys collated into single volumes, allowing for cross-cutting analyses to 
determine similarities and/or differences. Lucarelli and Fioamonti (2010) compiled works 
looking at the views of the EU from established and rising powers (the US, Russia, China, Brazil 
and India); Middle Eastern countries (Iran, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine) and also a number of 
international organisations and regional institutions. The study revealed that the EU is generally 
seen as a fragmented political actor (where it is viewed as a political actor at all) but most 
commonly as an economic actor (Fioramonti and Lucarelli, 2010: 220). The other study, 
convened by Chaban and Holland (2008) takes in the views of Australia, New Zealand, Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Thailand. This study found that, at the elite level, the EU‟s “economic 
prowess was widely acknowledged by Asia-Pacific elites” but again there was no strong 
perception of the EU as a political actor (Bain et al, 2008: 204-205). 
 
Elsewhere in the literature on policymakers‟ perceptions of the EU, again we find the 
recurring conclusion is that the EU is predominantly an economic power: policy elites in Canada, 
  8 
 
(Croci and Tossutti, 2007) Egypt (Bayoumi, 2007), Brazil, India and South Africa (Fioramonti 
and Poletti, 2008) all reportedly hold this view. In the latter study, the investigators found that in 
India and South Africa the EU was seen to perpetuate Western domination, thus „economic 
power‟ was a negative conceptualisation (Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008: 177-8). The author has 
found no reference in the literature to the arms embargo case as an important event for 
developing perceptions of the EU, and it is by exploring this avenue that the paper seeks to make 
a contribution to the literature.  
 
 The above studies have common traits. Most are based on surveys and/or interviews with 
policy elites and studies of official documents, the results of which are subjected to quantitative 
and qualitative analyses. While these approaches are to be commended, this paper suggests 
another way of looking at how outsiders view the EU: by examining not only say, but by 
considering what they do. The existing literature on outsiders‟ perspectives does not look at 
change in perceptions as a result of key events, which is argued here may be an appropriate way 
of examining how and why perceptions change over a relatively short period of time.  
 
The literature examining how the EU is viewed by others  is now expanding, yet relatively  
few studies have paid attention to the views of the US (e.g. Sperling, 2010) and China (e.g. 
Morini et al, 2010), which is surprising given their importance on the international scene. 
Further, despite the fact that the arms embargo debate occurred just before this proliferation of 
research on outsiders‟ views of the EU, no analysis of the debate‟s impact has been forthcoming. 
This presents an interesting opportunity to examine how to important but very different 
international actors conceptualise the EU. The EU‟s international presence is still very much in 
development and so it is to be expected that outsiders‟ views will change over time; whether 
these views will manage to keep pace with the EU‟s developments is another question. The rest 
of this paper will examine American and Chinese perceptions of the EU and how the arms 
embargo debate impacted upon their views.  
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American and Chinese Perspectives of the EU ‘Pre-Debate’ 
 
This section outlines how the EU was viewed by the US and China prior to the arms 
embargo debate. The analysis begins in 1993 to coincide with the Treaty of the European Union 
entering into force, and the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar 
which enhanced the EU‟s capacity for international action. Between 1993 and late 2003 when 
the proposal to lift the embargo was announced, the EU‟s „actorness‟ was in flux, with varying 
results for how American and Chinese perceptions. The EU‟s inability to prevent the Kosovo 
crisis and the internal dispute over Iraq had a negative impact on US perspectives, whereas 
China‟s publication of an EU policy paper and the launch of the strategic partnership indicated 
that the concept of the EU as an international actor was gaining acceptance amongst PRC 
policymakers.   
 
US Perspectives 
 
Despite the extent of the EU-US relationship, it was not until 1990 that the cooperative 
relationship was formalised by the Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations (EEAS, 2011). 
In the early years after the Cold War, the absence of an overriding threat to European security 
meant that although Europe remained an important factor in American foreign policy, it was not 
the top priority. The establishment of the EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in 1993 led to the US recognising the 
increasing importance of the EU as an international actor in its own right. This is reflected in the 
US-EU New Transatlantic Agenda document of 1995, which shifted the focus from the 
Transatlantic Declaration‟s terminology of the „European Community and its Member States‟ to 
the „European Union‟, a change which “implicitly recognises the character of the EU as a major 
international actor” (Monteleone, 2009: 92).  
 
Due to the absence of a Soviet threat and relative tranquillity in Europe in the first few 
years of the post-Cold War era, there were few substantive security/foreign policy issues on the 
US-EU agenda. However, the US‟ views of the EU as an international actor were called into 
question by the middle of the decade. Philip Gordon (1997/98: 74-5) noted that US policymakers 
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saw the EU‟s attempts to become more involved in dealing with foreign and security issues had 
largely been ineffective even within its own region, as demonstrated by the necessity of US 
involvement in the peace negotiations with the former Yugoslavia and diplomatic intervention 
between Greece and Turkey over Aegean Island.    
 
The EU‟s failure to resolve the conflict in Bosnia in 1995 had negative implications for 
American views, as the US‟ involvement was necessitated to save NATO‟s credibility and 
demonstrated that the Europeans were essentially incapable of dealing with crises on their own 
doorstep (Dunn, 2009: 16). Following the later failure to prevent the escalation of the Kosovo 
crisis, the idea that the EU needed to develop its capacity to act within the security sphere 
became increasingly salient amongst European policymakers. This led to the St Malo 
Declaration between France on the UK which outlined plans to pursue these aims (Cornish and 
Edwards, 2001: 588; Shepherd, 2009: 520) and opened the door for the development of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in an attempt to restore the EU‟s credibility, 
particularly in the eyes of the US, who essentially took over in the absence of a European 
capacity for leadership.  
 
The creation of the ESDP was seen in the US as a potential challenge to the dominance of 
NATO, and therefore there was some concern about the direction the EU was headed in. 
Although the US in principle supported a more coherent EU international presence, the apparent 
response was that ESDP was one step too far: the Clinton administration focused on the negative 
consequences of “decoupling Europe from the US, discrimination against NATO allies which 
are not EU members, and duplication of efforts and capabilities” (Cornish and Edwards, 2001: 
592 [original emphasis]). When the Bush administration took office in 2001, its position on 
ESDP efforts varied from support to opposition (Cornish and Edwards, 2001: 592), with the 
result that the American perspective of the EU at this time was somewhat ambiguous.     
 
The events of September 11
th
 presented significant challenges to the EU‟s developing 
capacity for action in international security affairs. Den Boer and Monar (2002: 11) identified 
three in particular: The  need to be a “credible partner of the US in a situation of crisis, make an 
effective contribution to international political and military action against global terrorism, and 
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to upgrade its own internal security measures and capabilities in the face of a dramatically 
increased terrorist threat”.  The EU immediately expressed its support for the US in confronting 
international terrorism, and shortly after contributed to military action in Afghanistan (Bono, 
2004: 445). Continued cooperation in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and the 
involvement in the Quartet process in the Middle East were areas in which the EU was identified 
as an important partner for facilitating peace and stability (Schnabel, 2002/2003: 96).     
 
However, the EU‟s position during the build-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq was vastly 
different. The EU was split over whether to support the invasion or not; France and Germany 
were two of the strongest opponents while the UK was a strong supporter. This opposition 
brought about a “dramatic end [to] the post-war transatlantic bargain – that of American 
leadership and European deference in exchange for a military security guarantee in Europe and 
beyond” (Dunn, 2009: 5). Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld made reference to those who 
opposed the war (France, Germany and Belgium amongst others) as „old Europe‟ and the 
supporters (the UK, Italy, Spain and the US-leaning Eastern European candidate countries) as 
„new Europe‟ (Bono, 2004: 445), playing on the internal divisions in Europe. The US‟ response 
illustrates views of the transatlantic relationship: the EU is the junior partner, and is expected to 
fall in line. Historically, American and European worldviews were similar, and such an 
important split in policy preferences served as a wake-up call to Americans that the EU‟s 
perspective of the global arena was now diverging from its own.  
 
Chinese Perspectives 
 
As mentioned above, there is reasonable basis for expecting that China‟s perspective on the 
EU as an international actor will be qualitatively different from that of the US. Historical 
experiences and the changing position of China in the international arena over a relatively short 
space of time are argued here to matter. The fact that China did not articulate its policy towards 
the EU until 2003 indicates there was little perceived need for a full-blown policy since the most 
important dimension of the relationship was trade. However, evolving Chinese views of the EU 
indicated an increasing acceptance of the EU as an international actor up until the arms embargo 
debate.  
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In the early 1990s, there was little in the way of political engagement between the EU and 
China. The biggest political issues were related to particular Member States: French arms sales 
to Taiwan up until 1994 (Shambaugh, 1996: 20); negotiations with the UK and Portugal on the 
impending handover of Hong Kong and Macau respectively (Hook and Neves, 2002). Arguably 
the largest political issue in EU-China relations was that of human rights, on which the EU 
would act collectively: the annual attempts to censure China for its human rights record at the 
UN Human Rights Commission. As such, the political weight of the EU had negative 
consequences for China. However, by adopting a „divide and conquer‟ strategy through offering 
incentives to certain Member States for abandoning the censure motions, China managed to end 
these annual EU efforts, illustrating how weak a political actor the EU remained when appeals 
were made to national interests.    
 
It is of no surprise then that the Chinese view of the EU at least until the early twenty-first 
century was primarily that of an economic actor in the international arena. The bilateral trade 
relationship developed far quicker than almost any other dimension of their ties, with the EU 
becoming a key market for Chinese exports. However, as trade burgeoned, the EU was pushing 
for greater recognition as an important international player from the PRC. The EU had produced 
four China policy papers between 1995 and 2003, and at the time China did not see the need for 
an EU policy, therefore Europeans effectively had to “sell” the concept to the Chinese over a 
period of time (El-Agraa, 2007: 199).  
 
The Chinese leadership increasingly came to see the EU as a potentially useful political 
partner. The benefit of a close relationship with the European Union from China‟s perspective is 
that it is conducive to the pursuit of a multipolar system and creates a “bridge” to facilitate 
China‟s emergence in the US-dominated international system at its own pace and since the US 
has often portrayed China as a „threat‟ whereas Europeans have not (Clegg, 2009: 132). China 
considers itself and the EU to be potential poles in a multipolar system, thus the EU‟s developing 
international presence is conducive to this end. This view has been reinforced by France – 
particularly under Chirac – often echoing the desire for multipolarity and arguably attempting to 
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pursue this end by guiding EU foreign policy in a way that promotes links with other emerging 
powers.   
 
On Iraq, France and Germany shared China‟s anti-war stance, but the internal divisions – 
particularly with the UK as firmly in support of the US – did not seem to have the same negative 
implications for China‟s approach to the EU as it did in the case of the US. While the US 
emphasised the differences (the old/new Europe characterisation), China was able to overlook 
these in pursuit of closer political relations. 2003 saw the launch of the EU-China strategic 
partnership and the publication of China‟s first policy document on the EU in the October of that 
year. The document identifies the EU as a “major force in the world” which “will play an 
increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs” (MoFA, 2003). It is noted 
that China and the EU do not have conflicting interests and do not pose a threat to each other, 
which paves the way for a cooperative relationship.  
 
The establishment of the EU-China strategic partnership in 2003 was intended to upgrade 
relations further The EU made efforts to stress that the term „strategic‟ did not indicate a 
“partnership aimed at counterbalancing US regional and global influence”, but rather it means 
comprehensive of the EU-China bilateral relationship (Berkofsky, 2006: 104-5), in what appears 
to be an attempt to assuage US concerns. Undoubtedly, the perceived importance of the strategic 
partnership was greater on the part of the EU than for China, as the former expected this to 
facilitate greater discussion of key issues, while the latter anticipated it would result in less 
discussion (Mattlin, 2009: 104), shielding the PRC leadership from pressure on sensitive topics.       
 
Around the same time, China‟s agreement with the EU on cooperation in the Galileo 
project
3
 and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) signified new heights 
in the EU-China relationship (Clegg, 2009: 133). In short, by late 2003 China-EU relations were 
arguably at their most extensive following a period in which, for China at least, the EU was 
primarily an economic actor in the international arena. Both sides apparently shared a desire to 
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develop the partnership further. It was in this environment in which China started to push more 
strongly for the lifting of the EU‟s arms embargo, in place since 1989.    
 
The EU Arms Embargo Debate 
 
This section briefly gives an overview of the arms embargo debate
4
 within Europe and 
between the EU and the US, which can be regarded as the „real‟ debate over the arms embargo. 
This develops an understanding of firstly the EU‟s intentions regarding the embargo (i.e. why the 
proposal to lift came about), why China sought to have the embargo lifted, and the grounds for 
the US‟ intense objection to the move. By outlining these positions and understanding the 
context of the debate, it is possible to examine the views of the EU as an international actor held 
by the US and China at that time, and also start to explore how the debate itself led to shifts in 
their perceptions of the EU.  
 
The desire to remove the embargo was not new. China had long sought to have the 
embargo removed, and there are indications that some within the EU had considered the idea 
before (Stumbaum, 2009: 171), but not seriously enough to make a move on the issue. However, 
China‟s EU policy paper stated that the “EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early 
date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defence industry and 
technologies” (MoFA, 2003). On a symbolic level, the embargo was seen as a relic of the Cold 
War, discriminatory and interference with China‟s domestic affairs (Vennesson: 2007, 426-427). 
Additionally, Chinese officials stated that they were not interested in buying weapons from 
Europe (Casarini, 2007: 375) – although did not rule out dual-use technology – which was a key 
concern for the US.  
 
On another level, the request to have the embargo may have represented a „test‟ by the 
PRC to determine to what extent the EU was committed to the strategic partnership, although 
there were obviously no public declarations of such a position. Rather, China stressed that 
maintaining the arms embargo was inconsistent with the development of a strategic partnership, 
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and its removal was a prerequisite for even closer relations. In this sense, the embargo case was a 
test of the EU‟s actorness to some degree, and the perceived failure of the EU illustrated that 
Member States continue to prevail.  
 
The move to lift the embargo was initiated by France and Germany at the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting of December 2003. However, prior to this 
particular meeting President Chirac had given the PRC leadership assurances that the embargo 
could be removed quickly without actually taking into account the position of the other Member 
States or indeed third parties such as the US. Chirac seems to have either overestimated his own 
clout within the EU, or underestimated the potential opposition to the proposal. One interviewee 
indicated that at the time, Chirac perceived the US as a „weakened‟ international actor as 
consequence of the disputes surrounding the invasion of Iraq; thus creating an environment in 
which discussing this move was feasible
5
. As such, Chirac spoke authoritatively on the matter, 
conveying the impression that the EU would be behind the proposal, indicating unity and 
coherence in its external relations. This would later be problematic for Chinese impressions of 
the EU as the internal divisions (indefinitely) delayed the embargo‟s end.  
 
While France was the first to propose lifting the embargo, others such as Germany also 
favoured the move, and the UK eventually came round to support the idea in May 2004 as 
confirmed by then Foreign Minister Jack Straw (Casarini, 2006: 31). Reportedly, the national 
governments of both France and Germany perceived improvements in China‟s human rights 
record which was still not excellent, but enough to render ostracising China along with the likes 
of Burma and Zimbabwe inappropriate due to its increasing international importance (Cabestan, 
2007: 138). As China was a strategic partner, and more importantly one which seemed to 
recognise the EU as a strategic partner/actor in return, arguments were made that the EU could 
not sustain this policy. 
 
The division within the EU on the matter was based on different perspectives on what 
mattered most in EU-China relations. Those in favour of lifting apparently prioritised economic 
concerns and good relations with China. Human rights, regional stability and cross-Strait 
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relations were absent from their considerations, at least in the early stages of the debate
6
. Those 
in the EU who favoured retaining the ban focused on human rights concerns, while the issues of 
Taiwan‟s security and regional stability tended to be concerns of the US (Archick et al, 2005: 
31). This was perhaps predictable because the EU had no comparable regional role as the US; 
however US critics were apparently surprised that their European allies would fail to recognise 
the problems lifting the embargo would cause. The lack of EU involvement in regional security 
meant that the underlying logic of the embargo had not been reinforced by changes in China‟s 
relative power as it had for the US.    
 
As the debate rumbled on throughout 2004 and into 2005, the US‟ opposition intensified 
when it looked like the EU was approaching a consensus to lift. The main motivations for 
opposing the move were that the original reasons for imposition – protection of human rights – 
were still of sufficient concern; to deny China access to high-end technology with military 
applications; and the maintenance of the US‟ relative power advantage over China7. On a 
symbolic level, the US argued that lifting without conditionality would send the wrong message 
to China. Additionally, if the EU‟s embargo disappeared, the PRC would argue that the US was 
the only actor that believed China was a threat to Taiwan in an attempt to pressure the US to 
drop its protective stance towards the island
8
. Given that the EU continued to press on building 
consensus, it appears that the US‟ arguments were not accepted by European policymakers, 
which served to weaken US perceptions of the EU as a responsible international actor.   
   
The adoption of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) by the PRC in March 2005 – which 
affirmed that “[t]he state shall never allow the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces to 
make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means” (China Daily, 2005) – was 
perceived by some in the EU and US as evidence of China‟s hostile intentions towards Taiwan. 
The ASL effectively ended the chances of the EU being able to take a decision by June 2005, 
particularly as the UK reverted to opposing the move. The EU had dispatched a delegation to 
Washington in a bid to persuade the US to drop its opposition. Their arrival coincided with the 
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introduction of the ASL and the delegation found itself on the defensive in what became an 
embarrassing situation for the EU
9
. Developments in the EU-China relationship had created a 
permissive environment allowing for consideration of lifting the embargo, but this evaporated 
when the US‟ disapproval and China‟s actions (passage of the ASL) led to a shift in 
considerations of the „appropriateness‟ of lifting the embargo at that time. Chances of returning 
to the issue in the near future were constrained when new Chancellor Angela Merkel officially 
switched Germany‟s stance on the issue.  
 
American and Chinese Perspectives of the EU ‘Post-Debate’ 
 
This section seeks to address the question of the extent to which the arms embargo debate 
impacted upon American and Chinese perspectives of the EU. The previous section highlighted 
some of the issues that the dispute threw up, but only by analysing the developments in policy 
since can the extent of the embargo‟s implications be comprehended. One caveat would be that 
these implications are not necessarily long-term; at the time of writing, less than six years have 
passed since the end of the debate. Nevertheless, shifts in perspectives even over the short-term 
are of significance during a period in which the EU has been attempting to consolidate its 
international presence.    
 
US Perspectives 
 
The predominant view amongst US policymakers was that the EU Member States who 
sought the end of the embargo were acting irresponsibly. At first, it appeared that the EU may 
not have been aware of US concerns, which may have been consequential of the US‟ failure to 
convey these concerns effectively in the years before the debate
10
. Americans had not recognised 
the reality that the previous „closeness‟ between American and European perceptions of the 
global security environment – forged during the Cold War – were now diverging11, even after the 
experience in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.  
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Previously, US policymakers were under the impression that European views on the 
necessity of the arms embargo matched their own. US policymakers saw two possible 
explanations for why certain actors in the EU had failed to understand their position on the 
embargo. Firstly, the EU simply was not aware of the US‟ security concerns that were entangled 
with the arms embargo and the absence of an EU presence in the Asia-Pacific meant that their 
understanding of the situation was limited. The other possibility was that those who favoured 
lifting were aware of the issues, but chose to ignore them for economic gain, although one 
interviewee indicated that they could not believe this would be the case, as despite differences, 
the EU and the US remain allies
12
.  
 
 At the very least, the fact that the EU had raised the issue of lifting the arms embargo – 
and continued to pursue the proposal after the US had voiced considerable opposition – was 
deleterious for American views of the EU as a responsible international actor and served to 
highlight the continued importance of the Member States. The EU attempted to reassure the 
Americans on its concerns, but these efforts were not well received. The fact that the EU 
delegation dispatched to Washington to assuage concerns on the day that the ASL was passed by 
China only further underlined the weakness of the EU as a political actor.  
 
A further consequence was that the EU failed to enhance its visibility as a credible 
international actor in its own right. Due to the internal divisions between Member States on the 
issue, the US applied substantial pressure at the national level amongst those states which would 
be inclined to support the US. The role of the EU3 in the debate – France and Germany as key 
proponents of the move while the UK‟s eventual „switch‟ to oppose the move was a critical 
juncture – reinforced American views that their governments were still the key interlocutors in 
the EU. The fact that the EU‟s attempt to lift the embargo was essentially ad-hoc and resulted in 
very public disagreements between key Member States further undermined US perceptions of the 
EU as a credible international actor
13
. 
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One of the first steps taken after the debate ended was the establishment of the US-EU 
Strategic Dialogue on East Asia. The US was initially keen to engage in such dialogue as an 
opportunity to convey their regional security concerns to their EU allies, in the hope that their 
perspectives on such matters could converge once more. EU policymakers were wary of the 
dialogue being employed as a platform by the US to „educate‟ them and instead sought to use the 
dialogue as a way to explain their position to their US counterparts
14
. The dialogue, however, has 
not been sustained. This perhaps underlines the fact that the US does not consider the EU as a 
key international actor, at least in relation to certain international security issues.  
 
However, the debate did not entirely undermine the EU‟s international actorness. If 
anything, the strength of US responses indicates how important EU foreign policy decisions may 
be if and when consensus is reached. What was damaged was the perception of the EU as a 
„responsible‟ international actor which still appears to be a byword for supportive of the US‟ 
position. More recently, US policymakers have welcomed the changes to the EU‟s external 
representation brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, indicating that the US favours a strong, 
coherent EU in the international arena. However, it is too early to determine the impact of these 
reforms on US perceptions of the EU as an international actor.   
 
Chinese Perspectives 
 
The main consequence of the arms embargo debate from China‟s perspective was that it 
highlighted how divided the EU remained in foreign affairs. Despite talk of the strategic 
partnership and deepening of EU-China relations, the EU was incapable of acting coherently on 
international stage. This resulted from the EU‟s (or more accurately, Chirac‟s) broken promises 
with regard to the „swift‟ removal of the embargo. Although the EU had initially resisted US 
pressure and it was with the advent of the ASL that the proposal to lift lost momentum, the 
Chinese leadership saw the EU as bowing to US demands, although apparently accepted that 
lifting at that time had become too politically contentious.   
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Stumbaum (2009: 83) has argued that the failure to reach a decision on the embargo at 
resulted in the “re-bilateralisation” of relations between Member States and China15 particularly 
on foreign and security issues although the EU remained the important point of contact on 
economic matters
16
. This is potentially divisive for conceptualisations of a common EU foreign 
policy and weakens the efficacy of EU „actorness‟ in relations with China, and consequently in 
the international arena broadly. It also has the potential to reorient Member State foreign policy 
away from the EU level if they perceive their interests as best served by their own efforts rather 
than attempting to foster a common policy. Overall, the conduct of the debate and the failure to 
reach a firm decision has damaged the perception of the EU as a coherent international actor in 
the eyes of China
17
. 
 
The arms embargo has not been forgotten by the PRC, and there have been periodic 
attempts by the Chinese to kick-start the process once more, although none of these have 
amounted to anything so far. Other issues – such as the EU‟s refusal to grant Market Economy 
Status (MES) – is still sensitive for China, reinforcing the perception that certain protectionist 
Member States can dominate the EU‟s economic policy. One possible advantage for China is 
that if the EU granted MES then this would add pressure for the US to do the same (Rémond, 
2007: 348); suggesting that China‟s EU policy is partly constructed in light of its approach to the 
US. Additionally, MES holds symbolic importance to the Chinese leadership, who see it is a 
form of discrimination and long to be treated as equals. China thus argues that granting of MES 
is necessary if the EU wants to develop their strategic partnership further (Rémond, 2007: 348).       
 
 As with the case of the US, however, the damage done does not appear to have been 
permanent. A clear example of this was agreement to further upgrade the EU-China strategic 
partnership through a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the negotiations for which 
began in 2007. However, China„s non-committal approach to the development of shared political 
values (Mattlin, 2009: 97) has protracted the process. Undoubtedly, the perceived importance of 
the strategic partnership is greater on the part of the EU than it is for China, as the former 
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expected this to facilitate greater discussion of key issues, while the latter anticipated it would 
result in less discussion (Mattlin, 2009: 104), shielding the PRC leadership from pressure on 
sensitive topics.       
 
 On the whole, however, China does not appear to view the EU as important as certain 
actors in the EU would be inclined to believe. Jonathan Holslag has argued that China‟s 
engagement of the EU is essentially “function of its own relationship with the United States” and 
as such treats the EU “as an intermediate player”, relegating it to secondary importance in 
China‟s foreign policy (Holslag, 2011: 308-9).  The arms embargo debate had a negative effect 
on the extent to which the EU was considered a credible international actor by the Chinese, 
although this has not been particularly severe, albeit since the starting point was relatively low 
anyway. China arguably continues to view the EU predominantly as an economic actor, although 
still displays an interest in enhancing the strategic partnership further, albeit on its own terms.  
 
Lessons Learned and Conclusions 
 
The evidence suggests that few lessons have in fact been learned by EU policymakers from 
the debate. The failure to maintain the EU-US strategic dialogue on East Asia means that a gap 
persists between US and EU perspectives on regional security concerns. That is not to say that 
they should have the same perspectives or that the EU must always follow the US‟ lead, but the 
two sides have stated a desire to develop mutual understanding to prevent such disputes in the 
future. Further, self-interested Member States retain the potential to undermine what progress has 
been made in the development of a unified EU external policy. The Spanish Presidency 
suggested in early 2010 that the embargo issue may be revisited, only to have Catherine Ashton 
sweep the issue back under the carpet
18
. Since the Spanish proposal did not make any substantial 
headway, there was no need for a response from the US. It seems likely however, that the 
response would have been the same as previously.      
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One interesting issue that came up in interviews with European-based officials was that the 
US had rarely criticised others in relation to arms sales to China
19
. For instance, Australia lifted 
its arms embargo against China in the 1990s with no consequence for its relationship with the 
US, and both Russia and Israel are major arms suppliers to China. However, what the EU 
apparently failed to appreciate is that the US sees the EU as a special case: not subservient to US 
policy demands, but rather their close alliance precipitates (or should do) common interests and 
shared values. The EU essentially undermines its own attempts to enhance its international 
actorness by failing to act like a responsible power in the international arena. The views of 
interviewees suggest that they have a different take on what constitutes „responsible‟ behaviour 
for the EU.     
 
This paper has suggested that outsiders‟ views on the EU as an international actor were 
damaged by the case of the arms embargo debate. The early positive signals to China, the 
problematic search for consensus, and the messy transatlantic debate all served to weaken the 
concept of a robust EU international identity. Whitman‟s  assessment of the EU‟s international 
role notes that the EU‟s capacity for action has “increased exponentially in the post-Cold War 
years” yet the range of actors and institutions involved in the EU‟s external representation 
contribute to complex arrangements which impedes its “influence and impact” (2010: 30). The 
inability of the involved actors to successfully navigate through these obstacles in the arms 
embargo debate served to reinforce the problems in managing relations with two of the world‟s 
foremost players. What is interesting is that EU policymakers appear to be aware of this
20
, but 
little has been done to rectify the situation. 
 
In early 2011, there were reports that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
Catherine Ashton, France and Spain have been engaged in discussions to look again at lifting the 
embargo (EUbusiness, 2010; Korski, 2011). So far, no details have emerged with regard to how 
the issue will be approached. However, if the issue does make it onto the Foreign Affairs 
Council‟s agenda, how it is handled will arguably be of even greater importance this time round 
for three main reasons. One, from China‟s perspective, failure to lift the embargo would confirm 
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the EU‟s weakness and subservience to the US‟ wishes. Two, from the American perspective, 
failure to engage in dialogue with the US at the earliest opportunity, attach formal conditionality 
for lifting and introduce concrete controls over dual-use technology transfers will probably result 
in the same response as the 2004/5 debate. Third, if Ashton comes out in favour of lifting the 
embargo – as seems plausible – but fails to receive support from the Member States (the UK and 
possibly Germany will be the main challenges this time), this could have serious implications for 
her own credibility and, moreover, the credibility of her position. This would also show that the 
Lisbon Treaty has not been particularly successful at addressing the problems of the EU‟s 
external representation. In short, the EU risks exposing the same weaknesses in its international 
actorness as it did when the debate first arose. On the other hand, successful navigation to a 
conclusion acceptable to all parties (whatever that may be) may underpin new perceptions of the 
EU as a serious international actor.        
 
The implications of the arms embargo debate for outsiders‟ views of the EU‟s „actorness 
have been deleterious in the short-term. The US became more sceptical of the EU‟s ability to act 
seriously in international security and reinforced the view that continued divisions between the 
Member States precluded a consistent EU international presence. The debate was a blow for the 
nascent EU-China strategic partnership, and the failure to deliver on promises led to a 
„rebilateralisation‟ at the Member State level in China‟s foreign policy towards the EU. 
However, this trend appears to have been relatively short-lived, with a return to focussing on the 
EU-level after a few years. It is still too soon to determine what long-term impact the debate will 
have had for the EU, which will partly depend on the lessons learned by EU policymakers and 
how the matter is handled in the future, as the embargo remains a bone of contention for all 
parties involved.  
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